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Abstract 
Sustainable development has been an important but elusive goal for the highly vulnerable 
small states in the South Pacific.  Events such as the current global financial crisis are likely 
to make this goal more elusive as the generous developed world donors, affected themselves, 
are compelled to revise the level of their assistance to less developed economies.  New, self–
dependent strategies and policies are required.  Inspired by the expanding finance–growth 
literature and based on findings that highly profitable and strongly capitalised international 
banks in the region may not only control finance but may also be contributing to users being 
‘involuntarily’ excluded from formal financial sector finance, this paper offers  a policy 
response in the form of corporate social responsibility for international banks in the region.  
Implications extend to other developing economies. 
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1.  Introduction 
Sustainable development has, at least since the United Nation’s 1992 Rio Declaration, 
increasingly become an issue of profound international concern.  Defined variously, 
sustainable development essentially entails ‘meeting the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy their own needs’ 
(Brundtland Commission, 1987)
2.  Globally, one region constantly at serious risk of 
development is the South Pacific; the small island developing states (hereafter, SP–SIDS)
3 of 
the region have persistently been burdened with ordinary economic growth challenges, 
sustainable  development—encompassing environmental, economic, social and political 
sustainability—would be a mammoth task.   
Indeed, the UN formally recognises (e.g. United Nations, 1992,)
4 economic growth as ‘an 
important and overriding priority for developing countries and is itself essential to meeting 
national and global sustainability objectives’ (section 33.3).  The UN also admits that 
inaction on the part of the international community to assist developing countries in their 
economic growth plans is likely to be devastating not only to these countries but would also 
not serve the interests of the developed countries and adversely affect humankind in general, 
including future generations. 
With issues such as the above in mind the UN 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development set in motion a new concerted international effort to tackling global sustainable 
development problems, with special attention to the problems in developing economies.  That 
undertaking has subsequently been re–affirmed several times, including at the 1994 Global 
Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development.  Important among these has been the 2000 
Millennium Declaration, which established quantitative benchmarks for achieving agreed 
                                                           
2  Formerly the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), now known by the name of its Chair Gro 
Harlem Brundtland.  Convened by the United Nations in 1983, the commission was created to address growing concerns 
regarding the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources worldwide and the 
consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development. 
3  SP–SIDS = South Pacific Small Island Developing States and include Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. 
4  Agenda 21, Chapter 33: A global agenda for transition to sustainability in the 21st century, agreed to by 178 countries at 
the 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. 3 
 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with the target for most set as 2015.  In short, the 
UN adopted a blueprint for a better world, and pledged to spare no effort in accomplishing 
the agreed goals.   
As pledged, the developed world has been providing substantial financial, technical and other 
support to the less developed economies, including to the SP–SIDS, resulting in important 
progress towards the MDGs.  However, less than five years from the target date, the world 
finds itself engulfed in unprecedented socio–economic crisis.  Severely affected themselves, 
the developed world finds it increasingly difficult to continue, at least for sometime, with the 
generous donations and other assistance to developing economies, resulting in worrying 
consequences for economies such as the SP–SIDS.  For instance, accomplishment of the 
MDGs could stall indefinitely and, exacerbated by the current sluggish and negative growth 
in these economies, could potentially amplify poverty levels and lead to a severe risk of 
social and political unrest (MDG Report, 2009).  
The above scenario presents the vulnerable SP–SIDS with a number of emerging important 
lessons, including that there may be a need to become more self–dependent.  As Taleb (2007) 
systematically demonstrates, random events such as the current global crisis, which often are 
overlooked in developing long–term policies and strategies such as the MDGs, may cause 
things to be put off track
5.  More worryingly, such events could to recur.  Moreover, the next 
crisis or other adverse event could be more damaging, compelling the developed world to 
review more drastically its financial and other aid to economies such as the SP–SIDS.   
On a positive note, the situation provides an opportunity for the SP–SIDS to investigate and 
develop new strategies for sustainable development and ostensibly, focussing on economic 
growth would, as always, be a top priority.  New strategies are required because a host of 
past strategies, including wide–ranging, growth–enhancing reforms and policies have been 
tried and tested but to little avail (e.g. Sharma and Nguyen, 2010a); the question is—what can 
be done differently  to stimulate growth, keeping long–term sustainable benefits in mind.   
And, this is where we make a valuable contribution: we offer in this article, a new, practical 
and sustainable strategy for dealing with growth problems in the SP–SIDS. 
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Our approach is inspired by escalating evidence that formal financial sectors may importantly 
influence a country’s economic growth.  Using Fiji as an example, we demonstrate that, in 
the case of the SP–SIDS, finance related growth opportunities may well be arbitrated by a 
handful of powerful international banks, which while enjoying exorbitant profits and very 
low solvency risks, may intentionally be driving firms away from the formal financial sector.  
We recommend that these banks in the SP–SIDS be required to become socially responsible 
corporations.  In light of the strong influence of these banks on the region’s sustainable 
economic growth, the alternative could well be in the form of formal regulation. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 highlights the difficulties for SP–SIDS 
in pursuing sustainable development goals noting the special disadvantages of these 
economies; section 3 reviews literature on the influence of formal financial sectors on 
economic growth and highlights the importance of access to finance for an effective finance–
growth link.  Section 4 demonstrates that a few international banks are the main providers of 
finance in the SP–SIDS and section 5 examines the profitability and stability of these banks.  
Section 6 shows how the main providers of finance may be making it difficult for users to 
access finance from the formal financial sector, having grave implications for economic 
growth and thus sustainable development.  Section 7 proposes a policy response, in the form 
of corporate social responsibility, to enhance access to finance in the SP–SIDS.  Section 8 
concludes. 
2.  Sustainable development and the small states of the South Pacific 
The socio–economic conditions of the SP–SIDS are indeed very challenging.  Small size, 
insularity, remoteness and proneness to natural disasters are among the few special 
disadvantages of these economies, which also render them highly vulnerable to external 
forces, threatening sometimes their economic viability (e.g. Streeten, 1993; Briguglio, 1995; 
Briguglio et al., 2006; ADB, 2004; UNEP, 2004).  Small size in the case of these economies 
also implies poor natural resource endowment and low interindustry linkages, resulting in 
high import content in relation to GDP and dependence on foreign exchange earnings, 
exacerbated by limited ability to influence prices due to the very small volume of trade 
relative to world markets.  Moreover, indivisibilities and limited scope for specialisation 
make it difficult to exploit the advantages of economies of scale, leading to high cost of 5 
 
productions, and infrastructural constructions, and high degree of dependence on imported 
technologies.   
Similarly, insularity and remoteness imply dependence on air and sea transport for exports 
and imports, which tend to be relatively high.  Moreover, small size usually excludes these 
economies from major sea and air transport routes, resulting in frequent delays, uncertainties, 
and constrains the ability to exploit the advantages of modern and technologically advanced 
means of transport.  Large stocks are often held to minimise related problems, which, implies 
additional costs associated with stock–keeping, including tied–up capital and rent for 
warehousing.   
To aggravate the situation, these economies are prone to natural disasters, especially 
cyclones, which are usually damaging; again, the small size exacerbates the costs and 
consequences, sometimes wiping out entire settlements, devastating certain business sectors, 
and threatening the very survival of economies.  Ironically, in relation to this last point, 
pressures on economic development has its own downsides, including fast depletion of 
agricultural land arising from increased demand for residential  housing and industrial 
production.  Some natural resources too, especially the non-renewable, have been depleted or 
almost depleted.  Global warming and rising sea levels pose new and additional 
environmental problems. 
The above special characteristics of the SP–SIDS make it difficult for these economies to 
self–grow and develop adequately, let alone in a sustainable fashion.  Moreover, some of 
these characteristics constantly render these economies vulnerable to external shocks.   
Consequently, the economies remain underdeveloped, fragile, burdened with high levels of 
poverty, unemployment, and experience other socio–economic problems. 
Fortunately, these economies tend to receive special attention of the international community, 
e.g. in the UN’s sustainable  development declarations, projects and programs.  The 
international community has indeed been providing enormous financial and other support to 
the SP–SIDS, increasingly so following the 1992 and subsequent UN declarations.  However, 
recent global events appear to make it difficult for the developed world, faced with their own 
huge recessionary, budgetary, social and political problems and constraints, to continue 6 
 
providing the same level of support.  At the international level, major advances in the fight 
against extreme poverty appears to have stalled, eradication of hunger reversed and aid 
programs slashed (MDG Report, 2009).  The consequences for the resource–constrained, 
poverty–stricken, fragile SP–SIDS appear grave: the economies could gradually plunge into 
more severe poverty, and be exposed to higher risks of social and political unrest. 
The above events suggest that the occurrence of the current global crises and/or the 
unprecedented extent of their consequences may have been inadequately incorporated or 
completely overlooked in developing the MDGs.  While such events may have escaped the 
minds of the 2000 MDG designers, they are likely to be given more consideration now.  The 
implications are many, including that the target dates for the MDGs need to be revised with 
not only the current crisis in mind but recognising also a possibility of future crisis, which 
may have greater consequences.  But, here lies a dilemma: how do we predict the timing and 
nature of a future crisis and its consequences?  The trouble is, huge disagreement prevails on 
even how the current crisis will unfold.   
Essentially, there now appears to be a lot of uncertainties regarding the accomplishment of 
the MDGs.  But, one thing is becoming more certain: economies such as the SP–SIDS need 
to learn to depend less on their generous donors and become more self–dependent.  In the 
context of sustainable development, an implication is to investigate strategies that are less 
dependent on the circumstances of the developed world.  As noted earlier, for economies 
such as the SP–SIDS, an overriding priority would be sustainable economic growth, which as 
discussed below, is importantly influenced by the formal financial sector. 
3.  Finance, growth and access to finance  
While some researchers disagree (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Meier and Seers, 1984; Miller, 1988) 
about the role of the financial sector in economic growth, two successive and comprehensive 
surveys by Levine (1997, 2005) show that increasingly many more, including Guiso et al., 
(2004), Goldsmith (1969), King and Levine (1993), and Rajan and Zingales (1998), accede 
that finance positively and strongly influences growth.  While not conclusive, the growing 
body of theoretical and empirical research suggests that the operation of the formal financial 7 
 
system
6 critically determines who can start a business and who can not, who can pay for 
education and who can not, who can exploit economic opportunities and who can not 
(Demirguc–Kunt and Levine 2008a).  Essentially, finance matters for economic opportunities 
of households and firms and for overall economic growth.   
Conceptually, consider the widely accepted importance of capital accumulation and 
technological evolution for economic growth.  While private firms are expected to generate 
these essential growth–enhancing ingredients, it is the formal financial sector that critically 
arbitrates how much capital will be accumulated and what will be the extent of technological 
evolution (figure 1).  That is, the ability of the private sector to generate the ingredients 
depends, inter alia, on how much funds they are able to obtain from the formal financial 
sector, which brings us to a related issue, that of firms’ access to formal financial sector 
finance.  Intuitively, the greater this access, the more a country’s economic growth, among 
other things.  However, to understand issues relating to access, it is important to understand 
first that access is not synonymous with use; a firm may have access but may not wish to use 
the services. 
Figure 1: The finance–private sector–economic growth link 
The figure illustrates the theory and empirical evidence that credit provided by the financial sector to the private 
sector may be employed in expanding capital and technology, which may enhance a country’s economic growth 
and development.  Thus, the extent and magnitude of credit provided by the financial to the private sector may 
importantly determine the rate of a country’s economic growth and development. 
 
The non–users—those that may have access but prefer not to use—or, the voluntarily 
excluded—include those that do not see any need or due to socio–cultural reasons (e.g. 
Demirguc–Kunt and Levine 2008a, Beck et al., 2007a, 2007b; Sharma and Reddy, 2003).  On 
the other hand, there may be those that need a service but do not have access or are denied 
access.  This group—the involuntarily excluded—may be further grouped as follows: (i) the 
                                                           
6 This study focuses on the role of the formal sector, including banks, nonbank financial institutions, capital markets and 
other forms of institutions covered in standard finance textbooks; it does not cover micro–credit programs and other 
informal systems. 
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un–bankable; (ii) the discriminated; (iii) the un–reachable; (iv) the product–excluded, and (v) 
the oppressed.   
The ‘un–bankable’ include those with inadequate own contribution and/or constitute very 
high risk; the ‘discriminated’ include those excluded on social, religious or ethnic grounds or 
other redlining practices; the ‘un–reachable’  include  e those considered commercially 
unviable due to physical access; the ‘product–excluded’ include those unable to afford the 
price and/or meet other product–related conditions; and the oppressed—where exclusion is 
based on ‘psychological’ barriers, such as negative views, mistrust and feelings of 
intimidation, and personal or others’ experience of past refusal. 
We believe that all users who fall in the ‘involuntarily excluded’ group demand some form of 
response from policy makers.  In this paper, focussing on the ‘product–excluded’ and the 
‘oppressed’ groups, we provide one such response for consideration by policy makers in the 
SP–SIDS.  But first, we investigate who the main providers of formal financial sector finance 
are in the region, and establish a rationale for our response. 
4.  Main providers of formal finance in the SP–SIDS 
We use Fiji as an example of the SP–SIDS for a number of reasons.  Fiji is one of only two in 
the region with a stock market and is considered to have a more developed financial system 
compared to other SP–SIDS (e.g. ADB, 2005).  Also, for expediency; among the SP–SIDS, 
data appears to be more readily available on Fiji. 
Fiji’s current financial system comprises a number of institutions and a capital market.  The 
institutions include five commercial banks, two finance companies, two residential mortgage 
providers, several insurance companies and unit trusts (similar to mutual funds), a 
development bank, a superannuation fund, and other non–bank financial institutions.  The 
capital markets encompass a stock market, a money market and a bond market.   
Finance to firms in Fiji provided by the capital markets appears insignificant.  Sharma and 
Nguyen (2010b) show that trading activities in the country’s stock market has always been 
extremely low.  Using TRADE (total value of shares traded/GDP), the authors show that, on 
an international basis, Fiji clearly stands out as a country with lowest levels of trading 9 
 
activity.  For example, Fiji’s TRADE was only approximately 0.10% to 0.30% of GDP in the 
period 1997–2005 compared with 23% to 65% in Malaysia, 40% to 84% in Australia and 
60% to 100% in Singapore.  Sharma and Roca (2010) confirm that trading has indeed been 
extremely weak and negligible, suggesting also that there may be a need to review the role of 
a stock market in a country such as Fiji, with a likelihood of discontinuing. 
Consequently,  the main suppliers of finance to private sector firms in Fiji are financial 
institutions.  The volume of such finance or credit may be measured by PRVY—private 
sector credit by all financial institutions relative to GDP (Sharma, 2009).  Table 1 (panel A) 
shows that PRVY in Fiji over the period 1970–2007 appears to have risen gradually from 
around 12% to around 48%, respectively (Beck et. al., 2010).  Indicated by BPRVY, the table 
also shows the volume of credit to the private sector provided independently by the banking 
sector.  And, the last column provides banks’ relevant market share (BPRVY/PRVY).  The 
results are noteworthy: on average, the  banking sector provided 92% of all financial 
institution credit to the private sector.  To better appreciate the banking sector’s dominant 
role, comparison may also be made to the credit facilitated by the stock market; over the 
period 1997–2007, the average ratio of BPRVY to TRADE was in excess of 300 times (table 
1, panel B).  That is, credit facilitated by the stock market was infinitesimal compared to that 
provided by the banks; for example, in 2007, the banking sector provided 757 times more 
credit to the private sector compared to that facilitated by the stock market. 1 
 
Table 1: The extent of finance provided to firms in Fiji by various segments of the formal 
financial sector 
Panel A: Private sector credit by all financial institutions (PRVY) and by banks only (BPRVY) 
in Fiji, 1970–2007 
To conserve space, the table shows data for five–year intervals only; the data for every year from 1970 to 2007 
are similar to that displayed in the table i.e. banks have constantly dominated credit to firms in Fiji.  Over this 
period, on average, banks provided 92% of all financial institution credit to firms. 
 
 
Credit by All FIs to 
GDP 
Credit by Banks only 
to GDP  Bank share 
Year  PRVY (%)  BPRVY (%)  BPRVY/PRVY 
1970  12.04  10.70  88.82 
1975  14.84  13.75  92.60 
1980  19.60  18.42  93.98 
1985  27.89  25.89  92.81 
1990  32.46  30.79  94.87 
1995  42.36  40.04  94.52 
2000  33.03  29.62  89.68 
2005  37.84  34.42  90.95 
2007  48.35  44.12  91.25 
Source: Beck, Demirguc and Levine (2008). 
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Panel B: Comparing credit provided by banks to private sector in Fiji to that provided by the 
stock market, 1997–2007 
While all relevant data is incomplete even for this shorter period of time (1997–2007), available data suggest 
that credit provided by banks to firms in Fiji far exceed the finance provided by the stock market.  The average 
ratio of BPRVY to TRADE was more than 300 times over the period 1997–2007.  That is, credit facilitated by 
the stock market was infinitesimal compared to that provided by the banks; for example, in 2007, the banking 
sector provided 757 times more credit to the private sector compared to that facilitated by the stock market. 
 
Credit by Banks 
only to GDP 
Total value of shares 
traded to GDP  Bank share 
  BPRVY (%)  TRADE (%)  BPRVY/TRADE 
1997  36.67  0.10  383.96 
1998  30.65  0.24  126.97 
1999  25.58  0.13  199.75 
2000  29.62  Na  - 
2001  29.71  Na  - 
2002  27.42  Na  - 
2003  28.35  0.10  284.50 
2004  30.57  0.28  110.74 
2005  34.42  0.15  230.62 
2006  39.30  0.10  381.38 
2007  44.12  0.06  757.26 
Source: Beck, Demirguc and Levine (2008). 
 All five commercial banks currently operating in Fiji are branches of foreign banks; while 
CNB
7 is locally incorporated, it is 100% foreign–owned.  Three of the banks are Australian 
(ANZ, Westpac and CNB), one from the Subcontinent (Bank of Baroda—BOB) and one 
from the South Pacific (Bank of South Pacific Limited
8—BSP from Papua New Guinea).  Of 
these, as table 2 shows, ANZ is clearly the largest bank provider of credit to the private sector 
in Fiji; over the 1999–2008 period
9, ANZ provided around 44% of total bank loans followed 
                                                           
7 ANZ = Australia and New Zealand Bank; BOB = Bank of Baroda; BSP = Bank of South Pacific; CNB = Colonial National Bank; 
HBL = Habib Bank Limited; WBC = Westpac Banking Corporation. 
8  Bank of South Pacific Ltd., a PNG owned and incorporated company, acquired HBL’s Fiji operations towards the end of 
2006. 
9 Data on Fiji operations of international banks is available from 1999. 2 
 
by WBC, which provided around 32% over the same period.  Together, ANZ and WBC 
provided around 76% of total bank loans, i.e. roughly 70% of the loans by all financial 
institutions in Fiji. 
Table 2: Asset and loan distribution: banking sector Fiji, 1999–2008 (in FJDm) 
To conserve space, the table shows data for selected years over the 1999–2008 period; the data for the rest of the 
years are similar to that displayed in the table i.e. ANZ and WBC are clearly the dominant banks in Fiji.  
Together, ANZ and WBC control around 70% of total banking assets and 75% of total bank loans.  Following 
from table 1 then, these banks dominate formal financial sector credit to firms in Fiji. 
Year  Bank   Tot Ass ($)   % of TA  ANZ_WBC  Tot Lon ($)   % of TL  ANZ_WBC 
2000  ANZ           700.59   42.1%           492.57   44.2%   
2000  BOB           184.82   11.1%             72.99   6.6%   
2000  CNB           218.97   13.2%           144.87   13.0%   
2000  HBL             47.56   2.9%             28.77   2.6%   
2000  WBC           512.99   30.8%           373.99   33.6%   
          1,664.93   100.0%  72.9%      1,113.19   100.0%  77.8% 
2004  ANZ           951.07   40.4%           657.79   42.8%   
2004  BOB           256.47   10.9%             89.62   5.8%   
2004  CNB           361.80   15.4%           254.36   16.6%   
2004  HBL             27.79   1.2%             12.67   0.8%   
2004  WBC           758.45   32.2%           521.11   33.9%   
          2,355.58   100.0%  72.6%      1,535.55   100.0%  76.8% 
2008  ANZ        1,526.81   39.7%        1,220.80   44.1%   
2008  BOB           377.70   9.8%           107.08   3.9%   
2008  CNB           741.97   19.3%           510.39   18.4%   
2008  BSP             76.69   2.0%             55.21   2.0%   
2008  WBC        1,123.12   29.2%           876.24   31.6%   
          3,846.29   100.0%  68.9%      2,769.72   100.0%  75.7% 
Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji: http://www.reservebank.gov.fj/pub_disclosure.html 
Note: Data for Fiji operations of the banks is available from 1999. 
 3 
 
Accordingly, the level of private sector credit in Fiji, and by implication, the country’s rate of 
growth and development appears to be importantly determined by two international banks—
ANZ and WBC, and that situation is unlikely to change in the near future (figure 2).   
Moreover, this situation is likely to prevail across the South Pacific.  Further, not only do 
ANZ and WBC control formal financial sector finance to firms in Fiji, they are also, as we 
show below, exorbitantly profitable and well–capitalised.  Yet, as shown subsequently, 
available evidence suggests that ‘product–exclusion’ practices of these banks and actions 
resulting in oppressed exclusion may be preventing many firms from accessing finance from 
the formal financial sector, having adverse implications for the  country’s  growth and 
sustainable development goals. 
Figure 2: The ANZFJ, WBCFJ–private sector–economic growth link 
If finance does matters for a country’s economic growth (as depicted in figure 1), then the level of private sector 
credit in Fiji, and thus the country’s rate of growth and development would appear to be critically determined by 
two international banks—ANZFJ and WBCFJ. 
  
5.  Profitability and capital adequacy of the main banks in Fiji ‘ 
5.1  Period of analysis 
The period 2007–2009 has been exceptionally trying for financial sectors worldwide; many 
institutions have been forced to stop operating, merge with others, or have been bailed out.  
Where damage has been less significant, to avoid contagion effects, governments have still 
had to provide conspicuous and tangible support, such as deposit guarantees.  In the case of 
Fiji, the year 2006 has another important implication; this is the year of the third coup d'état 
in the country.  Bearing the above in mind, and for expediency, we decided that a 2005–2009 
comparative analysis would provide reasonable insight into the performance of the main 
banks in Fiji.  To augment the analysis, we also provide the two banks’ performance over an 
extended, 2000–2009 period.   
5.2  Comparator banks and areas of performance 
ANZFJ, WBFFJ  Private Sector  Economic Growth 
and Development 4 
 
Since the two banks are Australian incorporated and due also to Australia’s proximity, level 
of financial development and leadership in the South Pacific, we decided to compare the 
performance of ANZ and WBC Fiji operations (hereafter ANZFJ and WBCFJ) with that of 
banks in Australia.  Because we are comparing Fiji operations with Australian, it makes sense 
to do this at least at two levels: against ANZ and WBC global operations, and against other 
banks, both national and regional.  In the latter group, the national banks include the rest of 
the four majors in Australia, i.e. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) and National 
Australia Bank (NAB) and three regionals: Adelaide, Bank of Queensland (BOQ) and St. 
George
10. 
A quick investigation of the data
11 revealed some dissimilarity in the constituents of variables 
that could be used to compare various areas of performance.   However, fortunately, 
comparing two areas of performance—profitability and capital adequacy—has been less 
challenging.  For example, the capital adequacy framework is applied in a similar manner in 
both Fiji and Australia.  Focussing on only two areas, nevertheless, does not dilute the 
analysis; in fact, profitability and capital adequacy are two of the more critical areas of bank 
performance.  Basically, we employ DuPont’s ROE (return on equity) model to analyse 
performance. 
5.2.1  Profitability  
To measure profitability, we use return on assets (ROA, net income to total assets), return on 
equity (ROE, net income to total equity), and profit margin (PM) ratios.  All ratios are before 
                                                           
10 Adelaide’s 2008–09 figures reflect the merger between itself and Bendigo (another regional bank); St. George merged 
with Westpac in 2009 but its 2009 accounts are still independently available. 
11 Data sources are various annual reports of respective banks available online and include: 
(a) for Westpac: http://www.westpac.com.au/about-westpac/investor-centre/annual_reports/ 
(b) for ANZ: http://www.shareholder.anz.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96910&p=irol-reportsannual 
(c) for CBA: http://www.commbank.com.au/about-us/shareholders/financial-information/annual-reports/ 
(d) for NAB: http://www.nabgroup.com/0,,32863,00.html 
(e) for Adelaide: http://www.bendigoadelaide.com.au/public/shareholders/annual_reports.asp 
(f) for BOQ: http://www.boq.com.au/shareholder_annual_report.htm 
(g) for St. George: http://www.stgeorge.com.au/investor-centre/annual-report.asp 5 
 
tax (bt) as well as after tax (at).  Table 3, which provides simple averages for the 2005–2009 
period, shows that over this period, by all profitability measures, Fiji operations of both ANZ 
and Westpac have been much more profitable compared to respective global operations and 
other national and regional banks in Australia.  For example, ANZFJ’s and WBCFJ’s ROEbt, 
on average, were 180 and 300 times more than their global operations, respectively.  To 
illustrate further, WBCFJ’s ROEbt was on average 880 times more than Adelaide’s (note that 
Adelaide had merged with Bendigo in 2008).  Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of 
ANZFJ’s and WBCFJ’s comparative profit performance.   
Table 3: Average profitability ratios: ANZFJ, WBCFJ versus Australian banks, 2005–2009 
The table shows that, over the 2005–2009 period, by the given three profitability measures i.e. return on assets 
(ROA, where bt= before tax; at = after tax), return on equity (ROE) and profit margin, Fiji operations of ANZ 
and WBC (panel A) have been more profitable compared to respective global operations (panel B) and other 
Australian banks at both the national and regional levels (panel C); it does not matter whether the ratio is before 
or after tax.  For example, the ROA(at) for the Fiji banks averaged 2.6 to 3.3% compared to 0.4 to 1% for banks 
in Australia, including the global operations of the Fiji banks. 
  ROA(at)  ROA(bt)  ROE(at)  ROE(bt)  PM(at)  PM(bt) 
Panel A: ANZ, WBC Fiji             
ANZFJ  2.61%  3.75%  33.44%  48.07%  26.72%  38.43% 
WBCFJ  3.27%  4.30%  33.14%  43.75%  36.55%  47.89% 
             
Panel B: ANZ, WBC Global             
ANZ Global  0.97%  1.34%  19.98%  14.38%  14.31%  18.33% 
WBC Global  0.86%  1.16%  23.05%  17.17%  12.47%  17.11% 
             
Panel C: Other Australian banks           
CBA  1.02%  1.26%  18.99%  15.35%  15.56%  19.29% 
NAB  0.94%  1.19%  16.67%  13.21%  14.25%  18.09% 
Adelaide  0.41%  0.47%  13.23%  11.00%  6.48%  7.37% 
BOQ  0.59%  0.84%  15.20%  10.71%  7.65%  10.88% 
St George  0.97%  1.32%  22.17%  16.20%  13.21%  17.96% 
Source: (i) For ANZFJ and WBCFJ: Reserve Bank of Fiji; (ii) for all other banks: respective annual reports from the Internet 
(see endnote 10 for URL details). 6 
 
The above profitability performance of ANZFJ and WBCFJ is consistent over a longer 
period.  For example, over 2000–2009, the respective average ROEbt of 3.57% and 4.46% 
were similar to the five–year results of 3.75% and 4.64%, indicating that these banks’ Fiji 
operations may have always been highly profitable.  Indeed, the Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Financial Services (in Fiji; hereafter, CIFS, 1999) notes, comparing performance 
of these banks to their global operations, that the Fiji operations of two banks were much 
more profitable in the 1990s—a view shared by White (1999), who notes that ‘it is 
impossible to escape the conclusion that (these) banks are clearly performing well in 
Fiji…’(p155). 
Figure 3: Average return on equity: ANZFJ, WBCFJ versus Australian banks, 2005–2009 
This figure illustrates, using the 2005–2009 simple averages of return on equity before tax (ROEbt), the 
comparative profitability of banks in Fiji (ANZFJ and WBCFJ) and a number of Australian banks.  It shows that 
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Source: (i) For ANZFJ and WBCFJ: Reserve Bank of Fiji; (ii) for all other banks: respective annual reports from the Internet 
(see endnote 10 for URL details). 
5.2.2  Capital adequacy 
Standard capital adequacy ratios have been used to measure performance in this area.   
Specifically, we use two ratios: tier 1 and total capital.  Per these regulatory requirements, 
adapted in both countries from the Basel recommendations, a minimum 4% is legally 
required for tier 1
12 and 8% for total capital.  In both cases, all banks included in the sample 
display strong capital positions; excesses are recorded with respect to both ratios.   
Nevertheless, as table 4 shows, the capital positions of both ANZFJ and WBCFJ appears 
                                                           
12  Tier 1 capital is often the most expensive and difficult to obtain but represent the most valuable part of total capital for 
banks around the world. 7 
 
stronger compared to their respective global operations and other banks in Australia, 
especially in relation to tier 1 capital (figure 4).   
Table 4: Average capital adequacy ratios: ANZFJ, WBCFJ versus Australian banks, 2005–2009 
Using the widely accepted capital adequacy measures i.e. tier 1 and total capital adequacy ratios, the table shows 
that, over the 2005–2009 period, Fiji operations of ANZ and WBC (panel A) have been far better capitalised 
compared to respective global operations (panel B) and other Australian banks at both the national and regional 
levels (panel C).  For example, on average, Tier 1 ratio has exceeded the minimum requirements by 6 to 8.5% 
for the Fiji banks compared to 2.9 to 3.7% for banks in Australia, including the global operations of the Fiji 
banks. 




CAR  Excess CAR 
Panel A: ANZ, WBC Fiji             
ANZ FJ  10.05%  4.00%  6.05%  11.33%  8.00%  3.33% 
WBC FJ  12.46%  4.00%  8.46%  13.52%  8.00%  5.52% 
             
Panel B: ANZ, WBC Global             
ANZ Global  7.74%  4.00%  3.74%  11.20%  8.00%  3.20% 
WBC Global  7.30%  4.00%  3.30%  10.08%  8.00%  2.08% 
             
Panel C: Other Australian banks             
CBA  7.68%  4.00%  3.68%  10.23%  8.00%  2.23% 
NAB  7.64%  4.00%  3.64%  10.74%  8.00%  2.74% 
Adelaide  6.77%  4.00%  2.77%  10.81%  8.00%  2.81% 
BOQ  8.38%  4.00%  4.38%  11.78%  8.00%  3.78% 
St George  6.90%  4.00%  2.90%  10.50%  8.00%  2.50% 
Source: (i) For ANZFJ and WBCFJ: Reserve Bank of Fiji; (ii) for all other banks: respective annual reports from the Internet 
(see endnote 10 for URL details) 
Again, the strong capital positions of both ANZFJ and WBCFJ are evident over an extended 
period of time.  For example, over 2000–2009, the average excesses for ANZFJ were 5.36% 
(tier 1) and 2.91% (total); for WBCFJ they were 6.96% (tier 1) and 4.54% (total), indicating 
again, that both ANZFJ and WBCFJ are very well capitalised to absorb business risks.   1 
 
Figure 4: Average excess tier 1 capital ratio: ANZFJ, WBCFJ versus Australian banks, 2005–
2009 
This figure illustrates, using the 2005–2009 simple averages of tier 1 capital ratio, the capital strength of ANZFJ 
and WBCFJ compared to banks in Australia.  It shows that the capital position of banks in Fiji may be much 
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6.  Bank–driven exclusion practices 
Respectively, sections 4 and 5 show that two international banks control formal financial 
sector finance to firms in Fiji and that the Fiji operations of these banks are highly profitable 
and strongly capitalised.  Yet, as shown in this section, certain practices and behaviour of 
these banks may be driving firms away from the formal financial sector, having undesirable 
implications for the country’s economic growth. 
In section 3, we noted that while formal financial sectors may influence a country’s economic 
growth, a related issue of ‘access to finance’ had important implications for the extent of such 
influence, among other things.  Noting also that ‘access’ was different from ‘use’, we 
classified firms into ‘voluntarily excluded’ (have access but no need) and  ‘involuntarily 
excluded’ (have need but no access).  In this paper, we focus on two sub–groups under the 
latter classification: the ‘product–excluded’ and the ‘oppressed’.  It should be noted, 
however, that involuntary exclusion of any form is likely to retard economic growth and 
potentially increase poverty and inequality (e.g. Beck et. al., 2007a).   
Product exclusion 
In relation to credit provided to firms, product–exclusion practices usually include pricing 
(interest and not–interest) and collateral requirements; considered of course, by the user to be 2 
 
unreasonable.  In a survey of 193 banks across 58 countries, Beck et. al. (2007a) find that 
while access to banking services may be taken for granted in the developed world, price and 
non–price barriers prevent access to banking services in many developing countries.   
Ironically, on one hand, market frictions such as transaction costs and information 
asymmetries give rise to financial markets and institutions (e.g. Diamond, 1984, 1991; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescot, 1986), on the other, these very frictions 
may prevent a user from accessing services, such as finance, from the financial sector.   
In the case of Fiji as well, a representative SP–SIDS, product–exclusion practices i.e. 
excluding users (including firms) on grounds of pricing and collateral requirements appear to 
be taking place.  For example, the CIFS (1999) observes claims by users across the country 
that bank interest rates, fees and charges are extremely high; users are appalled that these 
could be applied to just “anything imaginable”—“fees are extremely high and totally 
unjustified …and imposed on every transaction, no matter how small and on every service…” 
(p18).   
The Committee’s own calculations revealed that, over the 1993–1997 period, net interest 
margins and spreads of banks in Fiji were noticeably larger compared to their consolidated 
global operations.  Moreover, the largest differences were noted for ANZFJ and WBCFJ, 
with the differences widening over the years; e.g. in the case of ANZFJ, the difference had 
widened from 27% in 1993 to 122% in 1997.  Similarly, over the same period, a comparison 
of margins and spreads of international banks in Fiji with banks operating in New Zealand 
and Australia revealed that banks in Fiji enjoyed significantly higher margins.  For example, 
in 1996, the net interest margin of international banks in Fiji was 4.6% compared to 2.9% in 
New Zealand and 3.8% in Australia.   
The Inquiry was a government response to growing public concerns and complaints that bank 
interest rates, fees and charges were excessively high.  Unfortunately, even after confirmation 
by the Committee that public concerns were valid, little seems to have been done to address 
the situation and public’s discontent appears to continue.  For example, four years after the 
Committee’s report, Sharma and Reddy (2003) find cost to still  be a major deterrent to 
banking services in Fiji.  Based on a survey of 300 respondents across the country, the study 3 
 
shows that a mere perception that costs are high increased the likelihood of an individual not 
seeking a bank service by up to 25%.   
In a more recent study, Sharma (2009) finds, based on a survey of 75 firms in Fiji
13, that cost 
continues to be the single biggest obstacle to firms obtaining finance from banks.  On a scale 
of 1—7, where 1 is very expensive and 7 is least expensive, most respondents considered 
bank finance to be highly expensive, twice as expensive as founders’ own capital, which was 
considered to be the least expensive form of capital.  Further evidence of high cost of banking 
services in Fiji may be discerned from findings in section 5 above; that Fiji operations of 
ANZFJ and WBCFJ could well be the most profitable business segment of the respective 
holding companies suggests that the cost of bank finance in Fiji could be relatively high.  The 
likelihood of this prospect increases in light of constantly high liquidity positions of these 
banks in Fiji (e.g. ADB, 2004, 2005; Reddy, 2008).  A quick investigation shows that, over 
the 2000–2009 period, both ANZFJ and WBCFJ consistently held around one–quarter of 
total assets in liquid form; profits, on the other hand, continued to increase over this period, 
due perhaps to rising interests, fees and charges.   
6.1  Oppressed exclusion 
Involuntarily excluded customers may also include those that have formed a view that banks 
are not for them and/or banks don’t want them.  The basis of such views usually includes 
personal or others’ experience of intimidation, unreasonable refusal,  and other adverse 
circumstances (e.g. Sharma and Reddy, 2003).  The responses, actions and behaviour of 
banks to public concerns and complaints, including those highlighted in section 6.1 above, 
appears to have done little to comfort the public; on the contrary, they are likely to aggravate 
‘psychological’ barriers to banking services.   
Banks’ (including ANZFJ and WBCFJ) response to customer complaints of high costs has 
been that: “they offer a product, and the consumer can take it or leave it” CIFS (1999, p29).  
Banks are of the view that it is the customer (not the banks) that “need(s) to change their 
behaviour and learn that banking is not free”; that services must be paid for.  In essence, their 
view is that they “are in business to make money….that (they) are operating on a commercial 
                                                           
13 The selection criteria considered characteristics such as size, business type/sector, date and place of incorporation, 
listing status and ownership type. 4 
 
basis and that is the way it should be” (p17).  They also believe, contrary to findings of the 
Committee, that the cost of banking services in Fiji was lower than in Australia and New 
Zealand.   
The Report also highlights (p14–15) cases where banks have ‘forcefully’ repossessed and 
sold collateral even where delay in repayments had only been temporary.  To aggravate the 
situation, customers’ pleas for restructure of repayments and/or offer of additional payments 
to make up  for the delays appear to be ignored and collateralised properties (including 
personal) are foreclosed and sold without due process and adequate notice.  In one of the 
reported cases, a little delay in shipment of imported goods financed by a letter of credit 
resulted in the client’s current account being debited.  It appears that the bank did not attempt 
to work–out the account with the client and escalating debts resulted eventually in the 
business being wound up.  Customers claim that banks’ lack of interest in addressing these 
issues have resulted in business and wealth losses, escalating debts, stress and trauma.   
There is little to show that things have changed in favour of customers since the 1999 inquiry.  
In relation to costs, for example, the banks’ did not offer to look into the complaints or 
review their policies nor have they, to date, attempted to disprove any of the claims and/or 
data presented by the Committee indicating a ‘profiteering’ or ‘gouging’ behaviour by banks.  
Similarly, there is little to show that banks did not agree with other claims of intimidating and 
unreasonable behaviour and actions nor is there evidence of an attempt to improve their 
image on issues of concern.  In the words of Newell (2005), the behaviour of banks in Fiji 
may be perceived as abuse of power and arrogance; that the banks are insensitive to the needs 
of the local community, unappreciative of exigencies, and inattentive to the voiced concerns 
of locals.   
As indicated earlier, we believe, as do other researchers (e.g. Demisrguc–Kunt and Levine, 
2008b) that there needs to be some, albeit different, policy response to minimise situations 
such as above and to encourage users to access banking services more widely.  Below, we 
offer one such response for consideration by policy makers in the SP–SIDS. 
7.  A case for corporate social responsibility for banks in Fiji 5 
 
There is a strong public perception that banks have a social responsibility to the community 
and the country; in the latter case, for stimulating growth, and a stronger perception that 
“foreign–owned banks are insensitive to socio–economic realities in Fiji” (CIFS, 1999, p20); 
that while the country’s progress was marginal, the banks enjoyed very high levels of profits 
and were reluctant to lend even when there was substantial excess liquidity in the system.  
The perception is that these banks appear to have little, if any, empathy for the adverse socio–
economic situation of the people and country which, in relative terms, gives them the most 
revenues.   
If finance does matter for sustainable development, then one policy response, in light of the 
above arguments, analysis and discussions would be to require international banks to become 
socially responsible towards sustainable development programs and efforts in the  region.  
The basic idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is that responsibility of business goes 
beyond just its legal responsibilities to shareholders and the notion of ‘profit maximisation’; 
corporations are expected to integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations.  
While there may not be any clear boundaries or agreement on the definition of CSR, growing 
worldwide expectations and acceptance for socially responsible behaviour by international 
corporations has led to a number of organisations, including the Social Accountability and 
Interfaith Centre for Corporate Responsibility, constructing universally applicable 
benchmarks for responsible business behaviour.  Standards have also been established on the 
basis of these expectations, including the Caux Round Table and the Global Reporting 
Initiatives.  Firm–specific universal codes have also been developed (Webb, 2004).   
Essentially, the requirements are designed to make it increasingly difficult for international 
firms to take advantage in and of, countries where standards are lax or non–existent.   
Given ANZFJ and WBCFJ’s crucial roles in the economic growth and thereby, sustainable 
development of the SP–SIDS (section 4), especially in light of their healthy profits and strong 
capital (section 5), it would be of interest, from a public policy perspective, to examine the 
CSR practices and commitments of these banks to the region.  To do that, we first outline 
some important elements of CSR. 6 
 
7.1  Reflexivity and dialog 
In establishing targets or guidelines for socially responsible business practices it appears 
important that an understanding of local contextual variables, including public expectations 
and moral demands be adequately incorporated (Bird and Smucker (2007).  Accordingly, in 
the context of arguments forwarded in this paper, and based on reflexivity and dialog—two 
crucial principles in developing social responsibility frameworks (e.g. Beschorner and 
Muller, 2007)—an important consideration for ANZFJ and WBCFJ should include the nature 
of their role in South Pacific region’s sustainable development process.  Reflexivity entails 
questions in relation to: (i) what is the problem? (ii) who am I (in relation to the problem)? 
and (iii) how can I contribute to solving the problem?  Dialog is related to reflexivity and 
leads to the questions of: (iv) how am I related to others? and (v) how do I have to organise 
my social relations to others as a problem–solving process? 
The authors argue, that in the course of developing appropriate socially responsible goals, 
corporations should ‘reflect’ on the nature of their roles in the community; universal 
standards may have to be modified via a process of continual ‘dialog’ with relevant local 
stakeholders and, a willingness to modify modes of operation.  In effect, constant evolution 
rather than codes developed elsewhere or modelled on others should guide the development 
and practice of acceptable businesses behaviour.   
In fact, business ethics per se  would dictate that ANZFJ  and  WBCFJ can not disregard 
existing national and regional socio–economic struggles while continuing to generate 
excessive profits; an engagement with the host communities in finding and offering 
assistance in mitigating the problems would be a more ethical and responsible reaction.  Nor 
would it be appropriate for the banks to only criticise the conditions they encounter in their 
operations.   
In the context of the findings, discussions and theme of this paper, the CSR of banks would 
have to include an undertaking to make credit more accessible to the private sector.  In doing 
so, as Bird and Smucker (2007) suggest, in consonance with many other researchers and 
commentators, the banks need to at least (i) better understand the institutional dynamics of 
the local context; and (ii) engage in an open, non–intimidating communication with local 7 
 
communities and others.  Below, we critically assess, keeping the foregoing issues in mind, 
the adequacy of the banks’ current CSR practices in the South Pacific. 
7.2  ANZFJ and WBCFJ’s current CSR practices in South Pacific 
ANZ and WBC’s presence in the South Pacific commenced in 1880 and 1901, respectively, 
with the first branch establishments in Fiji.  Over time, the operations of both banks have 
expanded to Cook Islands, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu.  Both banks offer a wide range of commercial banking services to the communities 
across the region, including (i) retail and business deposit and loan facilities; (ii) international 
trade finance and treasury services; (iii) debit and credit card products; (iv) asset financing 
and leasing; and (v) acquiring facilities and insurance. 
Both banks appear well–informed about the concept and importance of CSR; their practices 
and commitments to the region are well documented and published, including on the Internet.  
For example, ANZ identifies the following ‘priority’ areas for its CSR initiatives and 
investments: (i) education and employment for the disadvantaged; (ii) rural development; (iii) 
financial capability; (iv) responsible practices; and (v) urban stability
14.  Similarly, Westpac’s 
approach includes commitment to: (i) environment; (ii) social and community; (iii) 
governance; (iv) performance reporting and (v) a charitable trust
15.   
The banks outline a set of guidelines and programs for each of the above areas that form the 
framework for pursuing respective commitments.  The framework appears to have been 
developed in response to expectations of customers, employees, community groups, 
regulators and governments across Australia, New Zealand, Asia and the Pacific.  There is 
also some evidence of the contributions the banks have made to the environment and 
communities across the South Pacific.  However, the question remains: are the banks doing 
enough?  We attempt to answer that question next. 
7.3  ANZFJ and WBCFJ’s CSR in the South Pacific: an assessment  
                                                           
14 http://www.anz.com/about-us/corporate-responsibility/ 
15 http://www.westpac.com.au/about-westpac/sustainability-and-community/ 8 
 
It appears unlikely from the published information that the special disadvantages of the SP–
SIDS, as highlighted in section 2, have been given special consideration in developing the 
CSR frameworks of ANZFJ and WBCFJ or their operations elsewhere in the South Pacific.  
More importantly, there is no indication that the banks appreciate their crucial roles in the 
sustainable development process of the region; the documented CSR practices and 
commitments do not talk about making credit more affordable to the private sector in the 
region.  Essentially, the principles of ‘reflection’ and ‘dialog’ with local constituents appear 
to have been ignored in developing the frameworks.  On the contrary, it appears that 
universal frameworks are applied to the South Pacific. 
A number of studies (e.g. Griesse, 2007; Nwankwo, et al., 2007; Raufflet and do Amaral, 
2007) illustrate that, from the perspective of the locals, the most important consideration is 
how international businesses advance their social and economic welfare and an assurance that 
they are not exploited for purely private gains.  The issues of employment, fair wages, taxes, 
etc. are but merely ordinary matters; social responsibility requires active involvement in the 
development and maintenance of infrastructure, social services, and more importantly, 
advancement of general welfare, especially where government or other institutional support 
are weak and/or absent (Bird and Smucker, 2007).   
Ironically, the views of ANZFJ and WBCFJ appear to be confined to mundane matters; they 
appear convinced that they need not do more than pay taxes, provide employment and invest 
capital in the country (CIFS, 1999, p29).  In fact, they believe that social objective goals 
would be counter–productive in that they would impede competition.  The banks’ assert that 
their obligation is primarily to the shareholders, who happen to be entirely non–locals, and 
that social objectives are for governments, not commercial banks.  They appear so strongly 
opposed to the idea of corporate social responsibility that they even threaten to close business 
if required to adopt such responsibilities.  Their view is that they should not be asked to 
provide ‘uneconomical or free services’.   
The perception of the general public, including business and household bank customers, is 
that banks are indeed purely profit–oriented and are disinterested in their or the country’s 
welfare, that they have no sense of responsibility to their clients nor to the development of the 
country (p30) and that policies formulated overseas are implemented in Fiji regardless of 9 
 
appropriateness (p175).  They want banks to empathise with and be sensitive to the needs of 
Fiji’s population and to have vision as leaders of development. 
7.4  Regulation—an alternative to CSR 
It is not uncommon for states, in pursuing proper functioning of a market economy and to 
foster social justice, to implement necessary institutional frameworks, to resolve market 
failures, and to undertake redistributive policies (Amalric and Hauser, 2005).  Universal 
examples of state actions in accomplishing the foregoing include defining property rights, 
enforcing contracts, regulating monopolies, reducing information asymmetries, producing 
public goods, regulating externalities, and ensuring proper distribution of resources.  
In Fiji, based on the rationale of economic development, job creation, and productivity and 
earnings enhancement, and to influence liquidity, inflation and foreign reserve levels, bank 
credit, in the 1970–80 period, had been subjected to a number of direct government control 
and/or indirect influence.  Administered through regulations or moral suasion, the controls 
included quantitative restrictions, priority sector lending and interest rate ceilings.   
Quantitative restrictions were applied in the form of loans and liquid assets to deposit ratios 
and reserve requirements.  Enforced over the period 1980–1987, the loans-to-deposits ratio 
required banks to observe a maximum ratio of 65 per cent.  Introduced in 1974, the Liquid 
Asset Ratio (LAR) required banks to invest a minimum proportion of their deposits in 
government and government–guaranteed securities.  Introduced in 1973, the Statutory 
Reserve Deposit (SRD) has been used as an instrument of monetary policy.  Enforced over 
the period 1979–1987, mandatory or directed lending required banks to lend a certain 
proportion of their total deposits to priority sectors, including agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors.  Similarly, bank lending and deposit rates were also regulated until 1987.   
In pursuit of open market policies and market competition, regulations today are based on the 
rationale of prudential supervision, for purposes of promoting and strengthening the 
soundness and stability of financial institutions.  However, in view of the recognised critical 
role of banks in the national sustainable development process, should the banks fail to 
become more socially responsible, via explicit goals and outcomes, it may become necessary 
to re–regulate certain components of the banking business, such as re–introduction of 10 
 
directed lending and regulation of interest rates.  Public support for such a proposal is 
expected to be strong; there already is a perception that commercial banking behaviour 
should be monitored and regulated. 
8.  Conclusion 
Recognising that random events, such as the current global economic and social crisis, are 
highly likely to compel the developed world to cut back their generous donations and other 
assistance to underdeveloped and fragile economies such as the South Pacific’s Small Island 
Developing States (SP–SIDS)  resulting in stalled sustainable development progress, this 
paper suggests that these economies may need to become more self–dependent.  Recognising 
also that there is a need to investigate and develop new sustainable development strategies, 
the paper proposes a corporate social responsibility requirement for international banks in the 
SP–SIDS.   
The proposal is based on the following arguments.  Generally, 
1.  with respect to sustainable development, economic growth is “an important and 
overriding priority for developing countries and is itself essential to meeting national 
and global sustainability objectives” (United Nations, 1992); 
2.  formal financial sectors, via private sectors, positively and strongly influence a 
country’s economic growth; 
3.  access to finance is an important consideration for an effective finance–growth link; 
where access differs from use such that one may have access but not need finance 
(voluntarily excluded) or may need but have no access (involuntarily excluded); and 
4.  appropriate, albeit possibly different, policy responses may enhance access to formal 
finance for the ‘involuntarily excluded’ users (including the private sector) and lead to 
economic growth and desirable progress toward sustainable development. 
Specifically, in case of Fiji, a representative of the SP–SIDS,  
5.  formal financial sector finance is controlled by two international banks—ANZFJ and 
WBCFJ (FJ denotes Fiji operations of the respective banks); 11 
 
6.  while these banks enjoy high profits and strong capital positions, their actions and 
behaviour, on the other hand, may well be contributing to more and more users being 
‘involuntarily’ excluded from formal financial sector finance.  Moreover, these banks 
appear not to have much concern or empathy for the special economic disadvantages 
of the SP–SIDS or the adverse socio–economic conditions of financial service users; 
and 
7.  a policy response in the form of corporate social responsibility requirement for these 
banks may enhance access to formal finance and in turn lead to economic growth and 
sustainable development. 
With respect to corporate social responsibility, generic policies, we believe, are not 
appropriate in the case of the international banks in the SP–SIDS, a region endowed with 
special disadvantages, lack lustre economic growth and huge sustainable development 
challenges.  There is a need for the international banks, which critically influence the 
financing opportunities in these economies, to become, via reflexivity and dialogue, more 
sensitive to the needs, norms and values of the host communities.  The banks need to become 
more responsible in advancing efforts towards sustainable development programs  in the 
region; the alternative may well be in the form of appropriate regulation.   12 
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